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Doct
Exhaus
A. IN GENERAL
THE doctrine that a litigant must
exhaust his administrative remedies
The prior to seeking judicial relief performs
much the same function as the com-
parable rule in trial courts that an ap-
1rine peal can be taken only from a final
order. The exhaustion doctrine, like theof rule of finality, is concerned with the
Of" timing of judicial review of administra-
tive action. Where the exhaustion doc-
tion trine is applicable, it requires that the
administrative proceeding reach its com-
pletion before judicial review may be
of obtained.
Although federal and state courtsAdministrative have often repeated the statement thatjudicial relief must be denied until ad-
e ministrative remedies have been ex-Remedies hausted, the case law does not support
this extreme position. State and federal
in courts have often provided judicial re-
lief in the absence of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. Professor KenuethMicigan C. Davis reaches the following coiclu-
sions:
The law embodied in the holdings
clearly is that sometimes exhaustion is
required and sometimes not. No court
requires exhaustion when exhaustion will
involve irreparable injury and when the
agency is palpably witkout jurisdiction;
probably every court reqdi s exhaustion
when the question i31tsented is one
By
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within the agency's specialization and
when the administrative remedy is as
likely as the judicial remedy to provide
the wanted relief. In between these ex-
tremes is a vast array of problems on
which judicial action is variable and
difficult or impossible to predict.1
The most common type of exhaustion
problem involves attempts to challenge
the jurisdiction of an agency in ad-
vance of completion of an administra-
tive proceeding. Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp.2 is the leading fed-
eral case requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. The NLRB is-
sued a complaint against the company
charging unfair labor practices. After
the case had been set for hearing, the
company filed a bill in equity in a fed-
eral district court to enjoin the holding
of the hearing, alleging that the Board
was exceeding its constitutional powers
because the company's products were
not sold in interstate or foreign com-
merce, and that the hearing would
cause irreparable damage not only by
reason of direct cost and loss of time
but also because of serious impairment
of good will and harmonious relations
existing between the corporation and
its employees. The Supreme Court held
that "no one is entitled to judicial re-
lief for a supposed or threatened injury
mtil the prescribed administrative rem-
edly has been exhausted."- But the
court's broad language is contradicted
by the holdings of many cases in which
the court has passed upon questions of
administrative jurisdiction without re-
quiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies.4
1. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§20.01 (1958).
2. 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938).
3. 303 U.S. at 51. 58 S. Ct. at 463.
4. MeCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S. Ct. 671
(1963); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
79 S. Ct. 180 (1958); Allen v. Grand
Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 74 S. Ct.
745 (1954); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767, 67 S. Ct. 1026 (1947) (state courts
had first decided jurisdiction without im-
posing exhaustion requirement); Order of
Railway Conductors of America v. Swan,
329 U.S. 520, 67 S. Ct. 405 (1947)
The McCulloch case" is illustrative of
the cases allowing injunctive relief de-
spite the failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. A foreign shipowner
sought to enjoin the Regional Director
of the NLRB from holding a representa-
tion election. The court said nothing of
the "long-settled rule of judicial admin-
istration" which it had stated in abso-
lute terms in the Myers case. It justified
district court jurisdiction to enjoin by
saying:
• . . While here the Board has violated
no specific prohibition in the Act, the
overriding consideration is that the
Board's assertion of power to determine
the representation of foreign seamen
aboard vessels under foreign flags has
aroused vigorous protests from foreign
governments and created international
problems for our Government. Impor-
tant interests of the immediate parties
are of course at stake. But the presence
of public questions particularly high in
the scale of our national interest be-
cause of their international complexion
is a uniquely compelling justification
for prompt judicial resolution of the con-
troversy over the Board's power.
In short, the question whether judi-
cial relief is available prior to the con-
pletion of the administrative proceeding
rests upon a balancing of the reasons for
and against requiring exhaustion in the
particular situation.
1. Principal reasons for requiring ex-
haustion. A number of cases rely on
technical legal grounds in requiring ex-
haustion of administrative remedies -in
particular situations: (a) a court of
equity will not grant equitable relief
if an adequate remedy at law, i.e., the
administrative remedy and judicial re-
view thereof, is available;7 (b) an im-
(stalemate between two divisions of Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board); Publie
Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S. Ct. 369
(1943); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 557, 39 S. Ct. 375 (1919).
5. 372 U.S. 10, 83 S. Ct. 671 (1963).
6. 373 U.S., at 16-17, 83 S. Ct. at 675.
7. E.g., School District of Royal Oak v.
State Tenure Comm'n, 367 Mich. 689, 117
N.W.2d 181, 183 (1962): ". .. Equity
should not be used to obtain iriiiinctivw
relief where there is no proof that corn-
plainant would suffer irreparable injury."
11
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plicatioll or express statement in the
particular statute that a "final" order
is necessary for judicial review;8 and
(c) the statement that the review pro-
cedure prescribed by statute is the "ex-
clusive" method of judicial review.0 Al-
though these formal arguments are
stated in a number of cases, the prac-
tical considerations that underlie the ex-
haustion doctrine are more important in
determining actual results. The practical
considerations favoring the exhaustion
doctrine have to do with furthering or-
derly procedure, preserving the efficien-
cy of the administrative process, con-
serving judicial energies, and properly
allocating responsibilities between agen-
cies and courts. Among the most impor-
tant considerations are the following:
(a) precipitate resort to a court involves
the same problems of delay, disruption
and expense that may result from inter-
locutory appeals from trial courts; (b)
in some instances, application and in-
terpretation of law by a court is greatly
assisted by the full development of the
factual context by a prior administrative
hearing: (c) the complainant may win
before the agency, making resolution of
the question posed to the court unnec-
essary; and (d) there are some issues
which fall within administrative discre-
tion (i.e., the agency has greater rela-
tive competence on the particular issue
than a reviewing court).
2. Reasons for not requiring exhaustion.
The usual blanket statement of the doc-
trine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests upon several premises re-
lating to the nature of the administra-
tive remedy that is involved: (a) the
administrative remedy must be avail-
8. E.g., Eastern Utilities Associates v.
SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947), in
which a Boston company sought judicial
review of an administrative order setting
a case for hearing in Philadelphia. The
court held that "administrative orders of a
merely preliminary or procedural charac-
ter are not directly and immediately re-
viewable." 162F.2d, at 386.
9. Cf. Laffness v. Yaeger, 352 Mich. 468,
90 N.W.2d 487 (1958) (where statute pro-
vided for review of pension determination
by certiorari, declaratory judgment action
was unavailable).
able on his own initiative to the person
seeking judicial review; (b) it must not
involve unreasonable delay or expense;
and (c) the administrative remedy must
substantially protect the individual's
claim of right. It is clear that no ex-
haustion is required if these precondi-
tions do not exist. Moreover, the ex-
haustion doctrine is a discretionary door-
closing doctrine which need not be ap-
plied even when these basic conditions
are satisfied. Other circumstances may
outweigh the reasons supporting the ex-
haustion rule. Among the most impor-
tant circumstances justifying nonapplica-
tion of the exhaustion rule are the fol-
lowing: (a) the extent of injury from
pursuit of the administrative remedy;
(b) the relative importance of the issue
raised to the integrity of the adminis-
trative process or to the competency of
the administrative tribunal; (c) the de-
gree of clarity or doubt about the ques-
tion at issue; and (d) the extent to
which the issues involve, on the one
hand, the specialized understanding of
the agency or, on the other hand, the
interpretive abilities of courts in dealing
with statutory and constitutional ques-
tions.1)
B. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
IN MICHIGAN
The attitude of the Michigan courts
with respect to exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies reflects an understand-
ing of the general considerations dis-
cussed above. The doctrine that admin-
istrative remedies must normally be ex-
hausted is viewed as a rule of orderly
procedure which embodies due and de-
ferential regard for the legislative judg-
ment and policy in providing expert ad-
ministrative tribunals to deal with spe-
cialized fields. Yet the doctrine is not
viewed as an absolute jurisdictional
rule, but as a discretionary rule of
thumb to be departed from when the
interests of justice so require.
1. Cases requiring exhaustion. The typ-
ical case for the application of the ex-
10. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Trea-
tise §§20.01-20.10 (1958); Jaffe, Tlw Ex-
haustion of Administrative Remedies, 12
Buffalo L. Rev. 327-57 (1963).
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haustion doctrine is one in which a
party seeks judicial relief without hav-
ing taken an available and expeditious
appeal to higher administrative author-
ities. Two recent Michigan cases are il-
hlstrative. In School District of Benton
Harbor v. State Tenure Comm'n," a
teacher left his classroom and stayed
away two (lays; when he sought to re-
turn he was told that his actions had
been taken as a resignation. He filed a
petition with the tenure commission,
which scheduled a hearing on the ques-
tion whether the teacher had been dis-
charged in violation of the tenure act.
At this point the school district brought
an injunction suit in the circuit court,
seeking to enjoin the commission from
holding the hearing. The circuit court
dismissed the suit on the ground that
the school district had not exhausted its
administrative remedies, and the Su-
preme Court affirmed the dismissal. The
only issue in the case was whether the
teacher had voluntarily quit or had been
discharged, and this was precisely the
factual issue that the commission had
been authorized to determine. The ad-
ministrative process would be short-
circuited if the trial of this issue of fact
could be shifted to the circuit court by
filing an injunction suit. judicial review
of the commission's determination was
fu]lb adequate to protect all of the
rights of the school district; in fact, a
proceeding for judicial review of the
commission's final order in the case
,conclhding that the teacher had been
unlawfully discharged) was pending in
circuit court when the Supreme Court
decided the appeal in the injunction
suit.
Norman v. Barber Examiners Board1"
is similar. The board notified a barber
to appear at a hearing to show cause
why his license should not be suspended
or revoked. Instead of responding to
this notice, the barber sought an in-
junction restraining the board from hold-
ing the hearing. He charged that the
11. 372 Mich. 270, 126 N.W.2d 102
(1964).
12. 364 Micb. 360, 111 NAV.2d 48
(]961).
board was "out to get" him and that his
opportunity to present witnesses would
be unduly restricted. The court held
that fear and apprehension concerning
what may happen at a proposed hearing
does not state a claim for injunctive re-
lief, a result that seems clearly correct.
The board was the duly constituted
authority to hear factual issues involving
the revocation of barber license. The
statutory procedure would be disrupted
and the authority of the board abridged
if a litigant could get a court to hear
testimony that the board was biased
against him and would not conduct the
proposed hearing fairly. The barber's
allegations did not go to the compe-
tencv of the board to entertain the case,
but only to the possibility that it might
abuse its power in conducting ti~' hear-
ing. If procedural errors in fact did
occur during a subsequent hearing, they
could be considered in an appeal from
the board's determination.
In cases such as Benion Harbor
School District and Norman. supra, all
the reasons favoring the exhaustion doc-'
trine (utilizing the experience and
jiudgment of the agency, avoiding piece-
meal appeals, recognizing the primacy
of the agency in the field committed to
it by the legislature) are applicable.
There are no countervailing considera-
tions which justify a departure from the
general rule.
Other Michigan cases are to the same
effect in closely analogous situations.
One important line of cases holds that
actions for injunctive or declaratory re-
lief cannot be used as a substitute for
statutory review procedures. Thus in
Slezenger v. Liquor Control Comm'n,1 3
an administrative decision revoking a
liquor license could not be reviewed in
an injunction suit when the legislature
had prescribed a fully adequate method
of review by certiorari. Similarly. it was
held in Laiiness v. Yaegerm 4 that a de-
claratory judgment action could not be
13. 314 Mich. 644, 23 N.W.2d 243
(1946).
14. 352 Mich. 468, 90 NAV.2d 487
(1958).
13
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used as a substitute (apparently un-
timely) for the method of reviewing
employee pension claims prescribed by
statute. Another line of cases holds that
a member of a union must exhaust his
intra-union remedies before seeking ju-
dicial relief against the union for an
alleged failure of its fiduciary responsi-
bilities. 15 In the Holman case," ' which
involved the seniority claims of employ-
ees who had been placed in a new
bargaining unit along with persons em-
ployed at a newly purchased plant, the
court also held that the plaintiffs, by
abandoning charges filed with the
NLRB when the regional director de-
clined to issue a complaint, had failed
to exhaust remedies available under
federal law, which preempted the field;
the injunction suit in the state court,
therefore, was dismissed.
2. Cases excusing failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As has already
been indicated, the exhaustion doctrine
is inapplicable unless an adequate and
expeditious administrative remedy, which
will substantially protect his claim of
right, is available to an individual. A
number of Michigan cases explore the
meaning of these prerequisites for the
application of the exhaustion doctrine.
The inadequacy of the administrative
remedy was involved in Trojan v. Tay-
lor Township.17 A property owner re-
quested township officials to issue a
building permit for the construction of
a trailer park. They refused to do so,
and, without exhausting his administra-
tive remedy before the board of zoning
appeals, the property owner brought a
mandamus suit to compel issuance of
the permit. He alleged that the admin-
istrative remedy was "vain and useless"
because the officials had made up their
minds in advance. The court held that
15. Duff y v. Kelly, 353 Mich. 682, 91
N.W.2d 916 (1958): Cortez v. Ford Motor
Co., 349 Mich. 108, 126-27, 84 N.W.2d
523, 532 (1957); Holman v. Industrial S.
& Mfg. Co., 344 Mich. 235, 260-61, 74
N.W.2d 322, 333 (1955).
16. Holman v. Industrial S. & Mfg. Co.,
344 Mich. 235, 74 N.W.2d 322 (1955).
17. 352 Mich. 636, 91 N.W.2d 9
(1958).
mandamus jurisdiction could be exer-
cised under such circumstances. The
court quoted with apparent approval
from the opinion of Judge Baum in the
circuit court:
. . . There is a general rule that per-
sons seeking authority from a govern-
mental unit must exhaust their remedies
within such governmental unit before
seeking relief in court. To this rule re-
quiring the plaintiff to exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies, there are a num-
ber of exceptions, one clear exception
is that the law will not require a citizen
to undertake a vain and useless act. The
law does not require useless expendi-
tures of effort. Where it is clear that
resort to the administrative body is but
a formal step on the way to the court-
house, the law will not require such a
step to be taken.
In other cases the exhaustion doctrine
is inapplicable because the administra-
tive agency does not have authority to
vindicate the claim of right asserte, by
the person invoking the jurisdiction of
the court. Thus, many cases allow con-
stitutional questions to be raised in a
judicial proceeding in advance of any
administrative determination. In Dation
v. Ford Motor Co.,19 the court stated
the usual rule that constitutional ques-
tions are for judicial rather, than agency
determination: "Generally speaking, an
administrative board, commission or de-
partment possessing powers of [quasi-
judicial] character does not undertake to
determine constitutional questions."'
If the claim asserted does not involve
factual issues but rests upon constitu-
tional interpretation, administrative rem-
edies need not be exhausted because the
agency is not competent to resolve the
constitutional questions. It has been
repeatedly held, for example, that an
equity court may consider the constitu-
tionality of regulatory or tax statutes
prior to an attempt to enforce them
against the complainant. In Diggs v.
18. 352 Mich., at 638-39, 91 N.W.2d,
at 10.
19. 314 Mich. 152, 22 N.W.2d 252
(1946).
20. 314 Mich., at 159, 22 N.W.2d, at
255.
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State Board of Embalmers,2'1 a funeral
lirector, instead of taking an appeal
from an administrative proceeding in
which his license had been revoked,
brought a suit in equity in the circuit
court alleging that the licensing statute
was unconstitutional. It was held that
injunctive relief was available. The fu-
neral director was not required to util-
ize a statutory procedure which he
claimed was part of the unconstitution-
al scheme; the remedy provided in the
license revocation proceeding, since it
could result in loss of livelihood to the
individual, is one that exposes him to
irreparable harm.
Thus it is well established in Michi-
gan that where a licensing or other reg-
ulatory statute is attacked as unconsti-
tutional, the court may grant injunctive
relief on a claim of irreparable injury
without requiring exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies. 2
2
Other cases in which failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies has been
excused involve nonconstitutional claims
of right which for one reason or an-
other need not be asserted before the
administrative agency. In London v.
City of Detroit."Y a property owner who
desired to continue to use land zoned
21. 321 Mich. 508, 32 N.W.2d 728
(1948), cert. denied 355 U.S. 885, 69 S.
Ct. 234, (1948).
22. Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control
Cammn, 316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W.2d 118
(1946) (female bartenders could bring a
suit to enjoin the liquor control commission
from enforcing a statutory provision ex-
cluding women, with some exceptions,
from bartending); General Motors Corp. v.
Attorney General, 294 Mich. 558, 293
N.W. 751 (1940) (allegation that threat-
ened criminal prosecutions will result in
irreparable harm must be taken as true on
motion to dismiss an injunction suit);
Lewis v. State Board of Dentistry, 277
Mich. 334, 269 N.W. 194 (1936) (den-
tists who were not in compliance with
statutory requirement that they practice
under the name stated on their licenses
could invoke equity jurisdiction, prior to
the institution of any administrative pro-
ceeding against them, to determine the con-
stitutionality of the statutory requirement).
23. 354 Mich. 571, 93 N.W.2d 262
(1958).
for residential purposes as a parking lot
sought to enjoin the city from inter-
fering with his plans. The failure to seek
a special permit, and the pendency of
an enforcement proceeding brought by
the city under the zoning ordinance,
did not prevent the court from granting
injunctive relief. The result turned on
the fact that the landowner's claim rest-
ed upon his assertion of preexisting use.
Since his rights stemmed from the zon-
ing ordinance itself, which recognized
preexisting uses, he was not required to
apply for a permit to continue a valid
nonconforming use. In short, the rights
he *was asserting could not be vindicat-
ed in the administrative proceeding:
hence a resort to that procedure was un-
necessary.
Other zoning cases seem to recognize
broader departures from the exhaustion
doctrine. In Long v. Township of Nor-
ton,24 it was held that the court might
interpret a zoning ordinance in a declar-
atory judgment proceeding even though
the property owner had not exhausted
his administrative remedies before the
township building inspector and the
zoning board of appeals. The court em-
phasized that only a legal question was
involved, "which does not turn upon any
disputed issue of fact...."25 In Long
v. City of Highland Park,-"' declaratory
and injunctive relief was obtained by a
property owner who alleged that the
zoning ordinance was unreasonable and
confiscatory as applied to his property.
The court stated that relief need not
first be sought from the zoning author-
ities because they "do not have the
power to declare the ordinance uncon-
stitutional and void as applied to plain-
tiffs' property and they could not grant
the relief here sought. An attempt by
them to do so, which in effect would
result in a violation of the ordinance,
would have been ineffective."27
24. 327 Mich. 627, 42 N.W.2d 764
(1950).
25. 327 Mich., at 633, 42 N.W.2d, at
767.
26. 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10
(1951).
27. 329 Mich., at 149, 45 N.W.2d, at 11.
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3. Asserted lack of administrative juris-
diction. The most common situation in-
volving the applicability of the ex-
haustion doctrine arises when attempts
are made to challenge the jurisdiction
of an agency in advance of completion
of an administrative proceeding. The
decisions - in Michigan and elsewhere
- appear on the surface to go both
ways; but when the cases are examined
in the light of the policy considerations
discussed at the outset of this paper,
an underlying consistency emerges.
The grounds on which administrative
jurisdiction is challenged make a differ-
ence. The easiest situation is that in
which the basic statute authorizing the
agency to act is alleged to be unconsti-
tutional. Since agencies normally lack
power to hold their enabling legislation
unconstitutional, it is apparent that an
administrative proceeding cannot resolve
the claim of right which has been as-
serted. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies will not be required in this sit-
nation unless a factual hearing before
the administrative agency is necessar-
to develop a record on which the court
can better determine the constitutional
issues. In Michigan exhaustion has not
been required in this situation.8
Where the judicial challenge to agen-
cy jurisdiction is based on the ground
that the agency's exercise of jurisdiction
is unauthorized by its governing charter,
whether statute or constitution, failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is
commonly excused. In Ward v. Kee-
nan,29 the leading case, Chief Justice
Vanderbilt stated that administrative
remedies need not be exhausted "...
first, when the jurisdiction of the sta-
tutory tribunal [is] questioned on per-
suasive grounds... ; second, when ... the
charges asserted before it [are] so pal-
pably defective that its jurisdiction [is]
28. Long v. City of Highland Park, 329
Mich. 146. 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950); and see
the other cases cited in notes 19 and 22.
s1npra.
29. 3 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949).
merely colorable.. .."30 Similarly, other
state courts have declared that there is
an exception to the normal requirement
of exhaustion where the agency lacks
jurisdiction in the matter.31
Only two Michigan cases seem to deal
with advance challenges to administra-
tive jurisdiction, and they appear on the
face to go in opposite directions. In
Highland Park v. Fair Employment
Practices Conm'n,82 the city brought an
injunction proceeding in a circuit court
after the FEPC had initiated a pro-
ceeding involving charges that the city
was discriminating against Negroes in
employment. The city contended that
the FEPC was without authority to
hold the hearing because the fair em-
ployment practices act invaded munici-
pal authority and was unduly vague. In
an appeal by the city from the dismissal
of the suit, the court held that the au-
thority of the commission to entertain
the case should be considered and de-
cided in this injunction suit prior to
the completion of the administrative
proceeding.
On the merits the court then up-
held the authority of the commission to
entertain the complaint and to conduct
the hearing. The strength of the holding
on the jurisdictional question is en-
30. 3 N.J., at 308, 70 A.2d. at 8.
31. E.g., County of Los Angeles v. De-
partment of Social Welfare. 41 Cal.2d 455,
260 P.2d 41 (1953); St. Luke's Hospital
v. Labor Relations Conum'n. :320 Mass. 467.
70 N.E.2d 10 (1946) (jurisdiction to con-
duct certification proceeding may be chal-
lenged without exhausting remedies): West-
ern Pennsylvania Hospital N. Lichliter 340
Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206, 132 A.L.R. 1146
(1941) (jurisdiction of state labor board
may be challenged in injunction proceed-
ing before board has completed its pro-
ceeding), cf. the recent case of Willamette
ValleJ Lumber Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
226 Or. 543, 359 P.2d 98 (1961), in which
the court weighed factors of (1) irrepar-
able injury, (2) doubt on the jurisdictional
question, and (3) relative competence of
agency and court to decide the question
in holding that the jurisdiction of state tax
commissioners to increase personal property
assessments could not be challenged until
after the taxes had been assessed and paid,
32. 364 Mich. 508, 11 \.XV.2d 797
(1961).
16
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hanced by the fact that the court did
iot entertain questions relating to the
validity of provisions governing the
manner of appeal from final commission
)rders. The appeal provisions, which
were separable from the remainder of
the act, could not be attacked until
after the administrative remedy had
been exhausted. The city was not in-
voking the appeal procedure, and it
was problematical whether it ever would
do so. But the exhaustion doctrine was
not applied to the basic question of the
commission's authority. In refusing to
accept the commission's contention that
the entire case should be dismissed be-
cause of the city's failure to exhaust ad-
ininistrative remedies. the court noted
that the portions of the bill relating to
the authority of the commission did not
present any factual issues for determin-
ation. "The claims of unconstitutionality
contained therein could properly have
been determined in this chancery pro-
ceeding on a motion to dismiss the
bill.":m
In School District of Royal Oak v.
State Tenure Comm'n,34 on the other
hand, the court applied the exhaustion
doctrine in holding that a school dis-
trict could not obtain injunctive relief
against a tenure hearing before the
state commission prior to the completion
of the administrative proceeding. The
school district's attack on the adminis-
trative proceeding purported to rest on
the connission's lack of jurisdiction. On
closer examination, however, it is ap-
parent that the consideration favoring
the exhaustion doctrine outweighed the
opposing considerations. For the case
did not really present a legal question
involving the jurisdiction or authority of
the commission, but a factual dispute
on a matter within the competence and
specialized jurisdiction of the tenure
commission.
The facts of the Royal Oak case are
simple: a school district refused to re-
33. 364 Mich., at 519, 111 N.W.2d,
34. 367 Mich. 689, 117 N.W.2d 181
(1962 ).
new the contract of a teacher, claiming
that it was applying an established "re-
tirement" policy. The teacher initiated
a proceeding before the tenure com-
mission, seeking a hearing on the rea-
sons for discharge. At this point the
school district, alleging that the com-
mission had authority only of discharges
and not of "retirement," sought injunc-
tive relief in the courts. The Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a
showing of hardship or irreparable harm,
judicial relief is not available unless ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhaust-
ed. Although the language of the opin-
ion, as is true of many of these cases,
is overly broad, the result is sound.
The jurisdiction of the commission
over teacher dismissals was clear and
unquestioned. Its authority ovei etire-
ments as distinct from dismissals could
best be determined after a factual hear-
ing by the agency. The court could not
pass intelligently upon the legal question
without exploring a number of factual
issues which had been delegated to the
tenure commission: What was the school
district's "retirement" policy? How had
it been administered in the past? Was
the practice of year-to-year renewals for
teachers over 60 years of age merely a
device to circumvent the statutory ten-
ure requirements? Etc.
A current issue of concern is whether
uncertainties involving the constitutional
authority of Michigan's new Civil Rights
Commission can now be considered by
courts in advance of final disposition of
a case by the commission. There is
serious question, for example, whether
the Civil Rights Commission has any
authority to entertain proceedings in-
volving racial discrimination in the field
of private housing. I have elsewhere
examined the materials which relate to
this question of constitutional interpre-
tation and ventured certain conclu-
sions.3 5 Suppose, for example, that a
property owner refuses to sell his home
35. See Cramton, The Powers of the
Alichigan Civil Rights Commission, 63
Mich. L. Rev. 5-58 (1964).
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to a Negro because of the latter's race.
No common or statutory law in Michi-
gan provides any protection against this
form of private discrimination.- The
jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Commis-
sion, tinder article V, §29, of the 1963
constitution, extends only to "civil rights
guaranteed by law and by this constitu-
tion." Whether the new constitution
created enforceable guarantees against
racial discrimination in the field of pri-
vate housing is clearly a matter of great
public importance. May that issue be
immediately taken to the courts by a
property owner who has been charged
with such discrimination in a proceed-
ing brought before the commission? Or
does the doctrine that administrative
remedies must be exhausted preclude
an immediate judicial determination of
the constitutional question?
The proper answer is not entirely
clear, but the manner in which it should
be resolved is. A deliberate weighing of
the considerations for and against the
application of the exhaustion doctrine
is called for. The following considera-
tions might well enter into the balance:
(1) The extent to which Michigan's
new constitution created enforceable
rights in private citizens against the
discriminatory acts of other private
citizens is purely a question of law.
No factual materials will help to settle
that issue. It is a matter of constitu-
tional interpretation which must be
decided upon the basis of the consti-
tuitional language and its legislative
history. The only materials that need
to be consulted are those which are
the proper subject of judicial notice
(the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention, the Address to the Peo-
ple, and, to a lesser extent, newspaper
and circular material explaining the
work of the constitutional convention).
Moreover, the Civil Rights Com-
mission, even though it is a consti-
36. See McKibbin v. Corporatkni & Sec.
Comrn'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.WV.2d 557
(1963).
tutionally-created entity, remains an
administrative agency. The language
of article V, §29, which subjects the
commission to general laws govern-
ing "administrative agencies" and to
de novo review by the courts, clearly
indicates that the commission is an
"inferior tribunal." It is not empow-
ered to determine the scope of the
constitutional rights which fall within
its jurisdiction. That is a legal ques-
tion for the Michigan courts; no prior
administrative hearing will clarify the
meaning of the constitutional lan-
guage. In short, the question involved
is not only without the expertise of
the agency but is beyond the agency's
competence in the sense that it can
be finally determined only by the
courts.
(2) The administrative proceeding
before the commission does not pro-
vide an adequate and expeditious
remedy for the claim of right raised
by the hypothetical property owner
who has been accused of discriminat-
ing in the sale of his home. His claim
of right goes to the commission's
total lack of any authoritv in this
area. Since the commission's view on
this question is well-kii0wn and pre-
determined, an administrative hearing
on the factual issue of whether dis-
criminatory conduct did take place
serves no useful purpose. The com-
mission, speaking through its co-chair-
men and its executive director, has
repeatedly made it clear that it ac-
cepts the position advanced by At-
torney General Frank J. Kelley, who
has declared that the 1963 constitu-
tion vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the commission to vindicate broad
new civil rights protecting individ-
uals from private racial discrimina-
tion in the housing field.-7 There is
even some question whether the com-
mission, even if it so desired, could
depart from the view expressed by
37. Ops. Mich. Att'y Gen. No. 4161
(July 22, 1963); id., No. 4195 (Oct. 3,
1963); id., No. 4211 (Nov. 18, 1963).
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the chief law enforcement officer of
the state, prior to the expression of
differing views in an authoritative
judicial decision. As in Trojan v. Tay-
lor Township,3 S the administrative
remedy would be "vain and useless,"
since it cannot result in a prompt
resolution of the question of constitu-
tional interpretation.
(3) It cannot be disputed that the
question of constitutional interpreta-
tion casts a large shadow upon any
assertion of power by the Civil Rights
Commission in the field of private
housing. There is no question but that
the issue is a serious and debatable
one. however it may be finally re-
solved. If the 1963 constitution did
not create enforceable new rights
against private discrimination, then
the commission is entirely without
jurisdiction in that important area,
since the commission's jurisdiction ex-
tends only to "the civil rights guaran-
teed by law and by this constitution."
The existing uncertainty prevents the
commission from taking the forceful
action in the housing field that it
might take if its authority were not so
doubtful. It prevents local govern-
ments, even those such as Ann Arbor
and Grand Rapids which have enact-
ed fair housing ordinances, from seek-
ing to remedy the evils of housing
discrimination by local action. And
it strengthens the hand of those in the
legislative branch of government who
would frustrate the protest movement
by stalling and temporizing. A prompt
and authoritative judicial resolution
of the legal issues would end this
period of paralysis.
(4) A consideration which relates
only to the situation under discussion,
and not to the general problem of
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
arises from the language of the consti-
tutional provision creating the Civil
Rights Commission. Article V, §29,
of the 1963 constitution, which creates
the counmission and governs its pow-
ers, is qualified b\ the following sen-
tence:
• . . Nothing contained in this sec-
tion shall be construed to diminish
the right of any party to direct and
immediate legal or equitable remedies
in the courts of this state.
This sentence might be taken as ob-
viating any consideration of the gen-
eral principles relating to the ex-
haustion problem, since it refers to
the "right" of any "party" before the
commission "to direct and immediate"
"equitable" remedies in the courts of
the state. I believe such a view would
be mistaken. The sentence does not
create any new judicial remedies; it
merely preserves those which existed
at the time. If equitable relief against
administrative action could be obtain-
ed under prior law, the same reme-
dies may be obtained against the
Civil Rights Commission today. The
framers were apparently concerned
lest the constitutional status of the
commission lead the courts to the er-
roneous conclusion that it should not
be treated in the same manner as
other administrative agencies. But the
framers did not intend to abolish the
doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies insofar as the Civil
Rights Commission was concerned.
(5) The only consideration weighing
in the other direction is the modest
showing of irreparable harm that can
be advanced by the property owner.
Forcing him to postpone judicial reso-
lution of the questions of constitution-
al interpretation until after a factual
hearing by the commission will cause
him expense, inconvenience and em-
barrassment. His business practices
may be affected in the meantime. But
the degree of hardship and injury is
not very great.
The willingness of the Supreme
Court in Highland Park v. Fair Em-
ployment Practices Comm'n,39 to con-
39. 364 Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d 797
38. 352 Mich. 636, 91 N.W.2d 9 (1958). (1961).
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sider the constitutionality of the fair
employment practices act prior to the
completion of the administrative hear-
ing suggests that the same approach
is likely to be taken in the analogous
situation under discussion. Support
might also be drawn from cases in-
volving the same questions which
have arisen in other jurisdictions. Le-
vitt & Sons v. State Division Against
Discrimination,40 is squarely in point.
A housing-project developer was
charged in complaints filed with the
division with discriminating against
individual Negroes in the sale of
houses. When conciliation failed, the
complaints were set for administra-
tive hearing. The developer then
brought suit in a trial court of gener-
al jurisdiction, challenging the juris-
diction of the division to hear the
complaints and attacking the consti-
tutionality of the underlying statute.
The trial court dismissed the suit on
ground that the developer had failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the exhaustion doctrine was in-
applicable:
Since the questions involved in this
appeal relate to the jurisdiction of the
administrative agency and the consti-
tutionality of the statute on which the
administrative action in question is
based, it is apparent that plaintiffs
should not be made to exhaust their
administrative remedies before pur.
suing the present action. Fischer v.
Bedminister Tp., 5 N.J. 534, 76 A.2d
673 (1950); Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J.
298, 302-309, 70 A.2d 77 (1949). The
questions are purely legal, an area
where the administrative expertise
would be of no real value. Under such
circumstances, we have consistently
held that exhaustion of administrative
remedies will not be required. Honig-
feld v. Byrnes, 14 N.J. 600, 604, 103
A.2d 598 (1954); Nolan v. Fitzpa-
trick, 9 N.J. 477, 89 A.2d 13
(1952).41
40. 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960),
appeal dismissed 363 U.S. 418, 80 S. Ct.
1215 (1960).
41. 31 N.J., at 523; 158 A.2d, at 181.
Similarly, a New York court con-
sidered and upheld the constitution-
ality of a New York City fair hous-
ing ordinance even though the plain-
tiff had not exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies.
42
CONCLUSION
In Michigan and elsewhere, cases in-
volving the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies contain overly
broad language indicating that exhaus-
tion is always required or never re-
quired. Upon closer analysis, however,
the decisions appear to reflect a care-
ful balancing of relevant considerations.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
is required when early resort to a court
will endanger the objectives of the ex-
haustion doctrine: furthering orderly
procedure, preserving the efficiency of
the administrative process, conserving
judicial energies, and propertly allocat-
ing responsibilities between agencies
and courts. On the other hand, the ex-
haustion doctrine is not applied - me-
chanically or unthinkingly - when other
considerations outweigh the objectives
of the exhaustion rule. Thus, the Michi-
gan cases do not require exhaustion
when (1) the plaintiff would suffer
serious injury if he were required to ex-
haust his administrative remedy; or
(2) the issue which he raises is a
doubtful question of law which is not
within the competence or the expertise
of the administrative agency. A viable
jurisprudence emerges when one con-
sults, not the broad language of isolated
cases, the holdings of the decisions.
However, a greater degree of articula-
tion of the controlling factors in the
opinions would be desirable, since it
would make the law easier to under-
stand and to administer.
42. Martin v. City of New York, 22 Misc.
2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Supreme Court
1960). The recent case of Marshall v. Kan-
sas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 93 A.L.R.2d
1012 (Mo. 1962), allowed a restaurant
owner to use a declaratory judgment action
to attack an ordinance prohibiting racial
discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation.
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